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Summary
The paper analyses the factors of capital adequacy in the banking FDI of Central and 
East European countries by relying on the Bankscope database. The main hypothesis 
is that parent ownership mitigated the impacts of the financial crisis on commercial 
banks, as parent banks capitalized those affiliates which turned red in household and 
corporate lending. This type of cross-market rebalancing is tested by a regression anal-
ysis. Several different factors were identified such as the too-big-to-fail phenomenon 
of parent banks, the FX rate volatility, the changing monetary environment repre-
sented by a 3-month market rate, the fiscal shock caused by sector-specific taxes and 
the risk of debtor failures represented by proxy of non-performing ratios.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: F31, F37, G17, G21, G33
Keywords: capital adequacy, capital adjustment, multinational banks, too-big-to-fail, 
non-performing loan, Central and Eastern Europe
Introduction
Due to the US financial crisis and the recession in the EU, the European banking sys-
tem suffered serious losses in the first decade of the new millennium. Moreover, the 
banking market of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) showed a variety of individual 
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impacts as a result of the multiple risks of national policy, foreign exchange and sol-
vency. Banks in the CEE region suffered capital losses due to global and local impacts. 
This process put a pressure on foreign investors to rethink their strategies and either 
re-capitalize the losses or withdraw their direct investment from the region.
The paper analyses these capital adjustment decisions, with focus on the following 
factors: 1) status of the parent bank; 2) foreign exchange rate volatility in CEE coun-
tries; 3) the changing monetary environment expressed in inter-bank market rates; 4) 
public finance induced shocks on the banking sector by sector-specific taxes; and 5) 
non-performing loans (NPL) in the domestic market of operation.
The hypothesis is that too-big-to-fail (TBTF) parent ownership mitigated the im-
pact on CEE commercial banks, as parent banks capitalized the affiliates that turned 
red in household and corporate lending. Accordingly, a strong cross-market rebalanc-
ing emerged in the Central and Eastern European region.
The analysis uses a multiple regression model including cyclical effects, monetary 
indicators, NPL ratios and a sector-specific tax dummy. The analysis demonstrates that 
the predominance of TBTF parent banks was a protective factor, as they ensured the 
necessary capital adjustments of their CEE bank affiliates.
The methodology is derived from capital buffering models and makes the regres-
sion model of the analysis. The methodological section commences with the theoreti-
cal origins of the composed estimation model, the optimal capital structure equation. 
Three indicators with an available database will be used to represent capital adequacy, 
thus testing the hypothesis in three different approaches. Finally, the empirical analy-
sis is followed by an explanation of correlation, significance and adequacy of the da-
tabase.
The empirical conclusions show that the macroeconomic and regulatory factors 
have an insignificant impact on the capability of CEE affiliates and branches of mul-
tinational banks, and it is almost only the financial power and investment strategy of 
the parent bank which matters in their capitalisation. 
CEE banking and cross-border linkages
Although, in the second decade of the 21st century, the CEE commercial banking sec-
tor operates in market economies as usual, the region has a legacy of the command 
economy that lasted up to 1989. Benczes (2008) summed up the impacts of the past 
on the banking sector, which was privatised relatively recently, transformed into a 
kind of two-tier system and opened up to foreign investors, who then became majority 
owners in the undercapitalized transition region. Besides, CEE markets are character-
ized by small scales, low financial penetration and low product diversification. These 
resulted in peculiar features regarding the vulnerability and stability of the CEE bank-
ing sector (Benczes, 2008, pp. 128-138).
The small and fragmented market in CEE is not only due to the region’s geograph-
ical and political fragmentation, but also to the differences between the national fi-
nancial and fiscal-monetary policy mixes and strategies. Sovereign risks and interest 
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rate policies affect the structure of loans and deposits differently. Before the global 
and the euro crisis, all CEE countries had national monetary autonomies. Some of 
them chose the strategy to pass it to the European Central Bank as soon as possible 
(Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia and Latvia), or are planning to do so (Bulgaria, Romania 
and Lithuania), while others have been making efforts to preserve the national cur-
rency (Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary). Certain monetary authorities apply 
strict and high interest rates, some do not. In the eve of the crisis certain countries 
had higher foreign reserves, others had lower, etc. These policy differences modi-
fied and differentiated the credit and deposit structure of the countries. According 
to Lentner’s (2015a) details and analysis of this process, foreign currency loans were 
spread by policy incentives. Due to the differences between the various national risk 
premium and interest rate policies, in the countries (Hungary, Baltic states, Romania, 
and the Ukraine) which retained high rates while also giving opportunity to foreign 
currency loans, the depreciation caused by the global panic in the emerging market 
currencies hit households and firms indebted in euro, Swiss franc or other foreign 
currencies. The solution for meeting the challenge of foreign currency indebtedness 
is described, among others, by Lentner’s case study (2015b). On the other hand, the 
countries which kept their risk premium close or below the euro area market rates 
were only slightly exposed to foreign exchange risks related to loans.
Árvai et al. (2009) focused on cross-border interbank spill-overs between Western 
and Eastern Europe. They recognized an asymmetric dependency of CEE countries 
on Western European banks, as banking contagion is determined (mitigated) to a 
major extent by multinational banks. The measured exposure of Western (except for 
Austrian and Swedish) banks is low. The historical market share figures of foreign 
banks clearly show that foreign ownership is predominant in the CEE region, consid-
erably beyond 50%, everywhere except Slovenia. Foreign ownership share is impor-
tant for two reasons: on one hand, strong ties with multinational banking provides 
indirect channels to one another in the CEE  region through the common lender 
parent bank; and on the other, the relatively big multinational banks mitigated and 
prevented the mass failure of CEE banking sectors as these TNCs had the liquidity to 
refund banks for their equity lost and guarantee the deposits left uncovered by the 
increasing amount of non-performing loans.
Theoretical background and the reasonableness  
of regressors 
Moshirian (2008, p. 2291) concludes that FDI was an “important vehicle for multina-
tional banks to enter developing countries”. He diagnoses that the European finan-
cial integration and the emergence of large multinational banks started a new era in 
the competition and consolidation of banks. His assumes that the home country bias 
becomes much smaller in an integrated sectoral environment. 
First of all, it should be clarified why banks invest in a foreign country.2 Berger et al. 
(2001) assume a global advantage of multinational banks in comparison to domestic 
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banks, as multinationals have access to better technology to evaluate and monitor the 
risks and better practices to treat moral hazard. According to Goldberg and Saunders 
(1981), Brealey and Kaplanis (1996), Konopielko (1999), Buch (2000), Moshirian 
(2001) and Williams (2002), banks follow their customers. Others (Claessens et al., 
2001; Hymer, 1979) are of the view that banks seek efficiency and higher profitability, 
which can be achieved by extending the market or the number of foreign customers. 
Lesnik and Haan (2002) measured a strong positive correlation between the liberali-
sation of the banking market and the banking FDI moving into developing, transiting 
countries. Claessens et al. (2001) modelled tax advantages sought by foreign banks. 
In their studies on CEE and other post-Soviet European countries, Papi and Re-
voltella (2000), and Mathieson and Roldòs (2001) came to the conclusion that return 
on equity (ROE), the NPL ratio, the attitude of the host country’s authorities and 
the liberalisation of entry regulations were the most significant factors of attractive-
ness. Naaborg (2007), however, found that several studies in the literature contradict-
ed each other regarding the link between efficiency and foreign ownership. Horen 
(2007) analysed whether it matters if the host and home countries of banking FDI are 
developed or emerging ones when it comes to location decisions. Based on location-
related knowledge, he found that banks from developing countries are more impor-
tant in other developing national banking markets.
Although this paper seeks evidence for the capability of multinational affiliates to 
resist crises, one must keep in mind the statement made by Eller et al. (2006, p. 302), 
namely that “foreignness” does not automatically guarantee higher efficiency and 
competitiveness, and thus a higher economic growth multiplier. The current hypoth-
esis, however, does not concern cost efficiency but liquidity guaranteed by the TBTF 
nature of parents to avoid bank failure.
The market-seeking activities of multinational banks in CEE  countries resulted 
in predominant oligopolies in the regional banking market, backed by large banks 
considered to be too big to fail. In Stern and Feldman’s (2009) explanation, the TBTF 
phenomenon implies that political decision-makers bail out big banks in the case of 
a failure, because they fear an extended banking crisis and a sudden stop in lending, 
which may trigger general economic depression. TBTF parent banks are important 
factors in the re-capitalisation of the CEE banking sector, as the losses were ultimately 
backed by the parent banks’ home governments. Being a TBTF bank means it can 
suffer any degree of loss, their home government will save them, and that is why they 
can reserve their capability to re-capitalize their affiliated CEE banks with net losses. 
Which banks can be considered as TBTF? Stern and Feldman (2009, p. 12) define 
the term as banks that “play an important role in a country’s financial system and 
its economic performance”. Apart from the bank’s size, its share in payments and 
securities transactions also matters. This makes a bank ingrained in the economy, as 
market actors can assume with certainty that the government will save it in the case 
of a failure. 
Borio (2009) and Rixtel and Gasperini (2013) explain the importance of the eco-
nomic crisis on the funding of banks. In their view, the crisis increased the ratio of 
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non-performing loans rapidly reduced the prices of financial assets. This trend dete-
riorated the corporate value of banks, and is important for two reasons. First, parent 
banks can also be affected by toxic assets and non-performing loans in their domestic 
markets, as shown by Rixtel and Gasperini (2013, pp. 4, 7), who also demonstrated 
the impact of the crisis on the 3-month LIBOR, bank credit default swaps (CDS), 
and the permanent relative devaluation of global bank stock indices since 2008. This 
can reduce the parent banks’ financial capacity to refund CEE affiliates losing eq-
uity. However, it is offset by the TBTF nature of the parent banks and their bail-out. 
Second, the opposite shock through the intra-bank channel includes the case when 
the value of the affiliates is reduced by the consequences of the crisis, and the parent 
banks must raise funds to make their contribution to equity so that the affiliates can 
meet the capital requirements.
Fluctuations in foreign exchange (FX) rates may also have significant impacts. As, 
referring to the results of Froot and Stein’s (1991) model, Ushijima (2008, p. 293) 
states: “the limited access to external capital due to informational frictions renders 
FDI sensitive to foreign exchange rate... This is because appreciations of the home 
currency increase firms’ net worth or internal funds in terms of foreign currencies, 
enabling them to outbid foreign rivals in acquiring information-intensive overseas 
assets.” The composition of FX loans and the volatility of the FX rate can have an 
impact on assets and the equity of banks. Needless to say, clearly there is a degree of 
correlation between the NPL ratio and the FX rate. An increasing default risk was 
manifested in CEE due to the depreciation of national currencies, and the increasing 
risk premium of insurance against credit default swaps (CDS). The combined effects 
of recession in CEE economies, the liquidation of companies and the termination of 
jobs, declining wages in manufacturing and the depreciation of the value of the real 
estate stock as a guarantor of loans resulted in the depreciation of the credit stock. 
Part of the collateral value behind bank loans disappeared due to the recession of the 
real economy. 
In addition, monetary policies changed significantly due to the global crisis, not 
only in the Federal Reserve, but also in CEE and the Euroregion. Central bank rate 
cuts, increased money supply, innovative central bank interventions (e.g. two-week 
central bank bonds), etc. appeared. 
In the event of an economic crisis, new sources are required to increase the budget 
revenue, especially if the government is compelled to exercise fiscal discipline due to 
an unsustainable public debt and the consequent increased credit risk premium, or 
if there is shortage of credit on the capital markets. The banking sector can become 
tempting for the government, since banks work with money. In the CEE region, bank-
ing taxes and taxes on financial transfers have been in effect since 2010. For example, 
the Hungarian government levied taxes on banks’ turnover and transfer services in a 
very innovative manner, thus setting an example for Poland and other countries. In 
addition, the Hungarian government limited the banks’ opportunity to shift this bur-
den on the customers. The new taxes were imposed on a temporary basis, with refer-
ence to the crisis, but they eventually became a permanent component of the public 
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budget. Such tax shocks confirm the assumption that equity restoration is particularly 
related to losses from tax liabilities. In the literature, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
assume that an optimum capital structure is achieved if the marginal tax advantages 
and marginal disadvantages of bankruptcy are equal. Stolz (2007, p. 22) translates this 
to banking capital structure as a trade-off between “tax advantages of deposit financ-
ing and leverage related cost… due to the reserve requirements”. Hungary imposed 
a high bank tax on turnovers in 2011, but a lower rate had already existed since 2009. 
Slovenia levied a bank tax after August 2011. Slovakia imposed a one-time tax in 2012, 
but, not surprisingly, this turned out to be permanent in 2013 in a modified form. 
Poland imposed the bank tax in 2014. In the rest of the CEE countries bank tax had 
only existed in theory (e.g. Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria) or had not been part of 
the government’s taxation plans at all (e.g. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Czech 
Republic) before 2014.
Non-performing loans are a significant factor in banks’ assets and equity. The NPL 
ratio reduces a bank’s lending capacity via provisions. The assumption of the analysis 
is that an increasing NPL ratio forces the bank to decide whether it wants to keep its 
lending capacity with a capital increase or change the lending strategy and accept the 
reduced capacity.
Regression analysis is based on the following methodological background: the 
analysis of capital adjustment of banks in specific circumstances, defined in the in-
troduction, ought to be based on the literature of the optimal capital structure. Stolz 
(2007) surveys the change of capital buffers accumulated by banks in the case of the 
required charter value, reserve rate and minimum capital which try to prevent bank 
failures. This approach helps us develop the methodology along regulatory aspects. 
Stolz (2007, p. 13) defines the purpose of regulation as follows: “The traditional bank-
ing literature… has identified a moral hazard problem at banks, as depositors, the 
largest source of funds, are likely to be unable and/or unwilling to monitor banks’ 
investment strategies. This irresponsiveness of funding costs to banks’ risks gives rise 
to moral hazard behaviour on the part of banks: banks have an incentive to decrease 
capital-to-asset ratios and to increase asset risk, thereby increasing their probability 
of default and extracting wealth from deposit insurance system. Hence, regulation 
has to set minimum capital requirements, thereby forcing banks to hold more capital 
and, thus, placing more of their own funds at risk.”
She refers to the conclusion drawn by Merton (1978), which states that banks 
maintain their reserves above the required minimum and the charter value to have 
a buffer for any unexpected case. However, regulation can cause moral hazard if the 
total of the regulatory minimum capital requirement and the buffer exceed the book 
value. In this case, banks start to pay dividends from earnings instead of accumulat-
ing a buffer. Their “risk-loving and gambling for resurrection” strategy increases the 
moral hazard in the banking sector and makes the failure and contagion more likely. 
Based on this phenomenon, the Basel III regulation, which increased the capital re-
quirements, can result in the increasing need for re-capitalisation and/or for bail-out 
in the banking sector. This conclusion is confirmed by Gennotte and Pyle (1991), who 
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established that the capital minimum increases the risk of bank failure. In the earlier 
version of the Basel Standards, Berger and Udell (1994) as well as Peek and Rosen-
berg (1995) analysed the moral hazard of stricter regulations. Maurin and Toivanen 
(2012) also analysed the capital buffer. They also concluded that banks operate above 
the minimum capital requirements. 
Hanson et al. (2011) and Kok and Schepens (2013, pp. 6-7) studied the risk that, 
if banks reduce their assets, their lending activity must be suppressed, which has an 
adverse impact on non-financial investment and consumption, and generates depres-
sion. In addition, decline in assets means less securities in the banks’ portfolio. In 
addition, crises may reduce banks’ balance sheets and cut their equity instead of a 
capital increase. Special taxes on banking turnover or asset values have impacts simi-
lar to crises or to tightening regulatory measures. The authors refer to Lemmon et 
al. (2008), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Berger et al. (2008), and to Gropp and Hei-
der (2009), who examined the determinants of the optimum amount of bank capital 
and the speed of related capital adjustment. They emphasised that sometimes market 
implications overwrite or exceeds the regulation, and so the regulation will have no 
effect. On this basis, Gropp and Heider (2009) distinguish binding and non-binding 
capital requirements. 
The dynamic analysis of banks’capital adjustment to specific circumstances (de-
tailed above) may be based on the literature of the optimal capital structure. Spe-
cifically, the current regression analysis is based on the methodological ideas of Stolz 
(2007) and Kok and Schepens (2013). These models introduce the following dynamic 
function:
 K*i,t = b Xi, t-1 ,       (1)
where K*i,t is the bank-specific, time-varying optimal capital ratio in the dynamic 
model, and Xi, t-1 is the vector of bank-specific variables. The index i is the indicator of 
the bank and t is for the year. 
Adjustment is measured as a difference between the optimal ratios of two periods:
 Ki,t – Ki,t-1 = l (K
*
i,t – Ki,t-1) + Regulari,t ,    (2)
where Ki,t and Ki,t-1 are the effective capital ratios, and l is the speed of adjustment 
to the optimal ratio. A low value of l implies a passive capital management by banks. 
ei,t  is the residual. The projection of capital adjustment can be given as follows:
 Ki,t = l (b Xi, t-1 ) + (1 – l) Ki,t-1 + ei,t ,  0 < l < 1. (3)
The t and 1 indicators highlight the dependency of the capital ratio on the ratio of 
the previous period, thus making the model dynamic.
Methodology
The current focus is on the level of protection enjoyed by banks in the region or the 
degree of their vulnerability in terms of capital adequacy. The data is taken from 
the Bankscope database a comprehensive, global database of banks’ financial state-
ments. It contains the balances, financial reports and specific rating data of banks in 
CEE countries.3
248
Gábor Kutasi: Stability of CEE Banks in the Crisis Years
The baseline model is represented by the following equation:
 Ki,t = b0 + b1Ki,t-1 + b2 FXt + b3 RATEt + b4 NPLt + b5 Dparent-TBTF,t + b6 DTax,t ,    (4)
In equation (4), K is the capital adequacy indicator. FX is the standardized relative 
index of the annual nominal exchange rate in comparison to 2007, in euro, to the 
national currency, calculated as follows:
 FX = 1 + (FXi – FX2007)/FX2007     (5)
The calculation in equation (5) is necessary because first of all, the FX rates of na-
tional currencies to the euro are very different in terms of digits, requiring a common 
denominator. Second, banks work with a nominal volume of money and therefore 
the change in the nominal FX rates can significantly modify the net earnings and the 
value of assets, equity and liabilities. The FX rates are values at the end of the period 
(year). The benchmark is 2007, as the depreciation of CEE national currencies started 
at the end of the third quarter of 2008. 
RATE is the national, annual data of a 3-month money market interest rate cal-
culated by Eurostat. As economic cyclicality is included in the model with both the 
money market rate and the capital indicator of the previous period. To avoid excessive 
complexity and multicollinearity in monetary indicators, the three-month market in-
terest rate is the only monetary variable included in the regression analysis as a proxy 
for all money market and monetary policy processes.
NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans. In this analysis, its proxy is the Loan 
Loss Reserves / Gross Loan (LLRGL) ratio, which provides provisions against NPLs.4 
The regression model contains a dummy Dparent-TBTF for the parent bank’s position as 
a TBTF. Its value is 1 if the parent is TBTF and 0 otherwise. In this study the TBTF 
dummy is 1 if either of the following conditions apply: 
1) the parent bank is among the 250 largest European banks; 
2) the parent bank is among the 10 largest banks of its country of residence; 
3) the parent bank is among the 30 largest banks of its residence country if this 
country is Germany, Austria, France, Italy, USA, Japan, China, Netherlands, UK and 
Russia, as these countries have a large concentration of banks and are significant in-
vestors in the region; 
4) the parent bank is in state ownership;
5) the parent bank is backed by a car manufacturing holding (e.g. VW/Porsche, 
Renault Fiat, etc.). 
In any other case, the value of the dummy is 0.
The above-mentioned trade-off between tax advantages of deposit financing and 
leverage cost is represented by DTax, which is the dummy of national sector-specific 
taxes on banks, which is 1 if a bank tax is in effect. This way the model can distinguish 
years with and without a sector-specific tax in place.
As the two dummies reflect different aspects, it is important not to fall into the 
dummy variable trap (Gujarati and Porter, 2009, p. 281). Attention must also be paid 
to multicollinearity between the NPL ratio and the FX ratio. The depreciation of the 
national currency affects the NPL ratio in countries significantly indebted in FX cred-
its, as discussed above. The model does not contain direct GDP growth indicators to 
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eliminate any further multicollinearity, as the money market rate, the NPL ratio and 
Ki,t-1 already represent cyclical effects. 
As in light of the regressors, regression focuses on the correlation between the 
development of capital adequacy the model uses three Bankscope indicators for the 
adequacy of banking capital:
1) the TIER1 ratio, which expresses a banking firm’s core equity capital as a per-
centage of its total risk-weighted assets;
2) the Total Capital Ratio (TCR), which is a synonym for the Capital Adequacy Ratio 
and is calculated as follows: (Tier 1 capital + Tier 2 capital) / total risk-weighted assets;
3) the Equity to Total Assets ratio (ETA). 
The regression uses data for the period between 2009 and 2014. The geographical 
range is the eleven CEE EU member states, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Although 
there are 379 CEE  banks registered in Bankscope, only 290 of these had data for 
LLRGL and only 167 banks had TCR and ETA data for all of the years of the analysed 
period. The data are annual ones, since the quarterly breakdown has been very defi-
cient. 
With three ways of operationalizing the dependent variable, the specific regression 
functions are the following:
TIER1i,t = b0 + b1  TIER1i,t-1 + b2  FXt + b3  RATEt + b4  LLRGLi,t + b5  Dparent-TBTF, i,t + b6  DTax,t,   (6)
TCRi,t = b0 + b1  TCRi,t-1 + b2  FXt + b3  RATEt + b4  LLRGLi,t + b5  Dparent-TBTF, i,t + b6  DTax,t ,       (7)
ETAi,t = b0 + b1  ETAi,t-1 + b2  FXt + b3  RATEt + b4  LLRGLi,t + b5  Dparent-TBTF, i,t + b6  DTax,t ,          (8)
Data for FX and interest rates were downloaded from Eurostat. The banks’ ratios 
(TIER1, TCR, ETA, LLRGL) and the parent banks’ TBTF phenomenon were col-
lected on-line from Bankscope. Information on bank-specific taxes was collected from 
the business press. 
Analysis and results
The regression was run using OLS with the stepwise method which mode can fine 
tune the relevant regressors and excluded the insignificant ones. The overall results 
of the analysis are summed up in Table 1, which shows a high degree of fit with R2 
values around 0.78-0.8 The F-test results are highly significant and verify that the com-
position of regressors influence the three capital adequacy ratios. The Durbin-Watson 
test, which measures the autocorrelation of residuals, indicates that the results are 
over the upper bound. 
Based on an analysis of multicollinearity, regressors are independent from each oth-
er. Table 2 shows that the values for the variance inflation factor and tolerance are very 
low, which means that most of the regressors do not actually influence one another. 
Numbers in bold indicate moderate cases of covariance. An examination of the detailed 
correlation and covariance results reveals that collinearity is only strong between the 
interest rate and the foreign exchange rate (correlation was measured around -0.5 and 
-0.55), as logically follows and expected from the interest rate parity theory. Besides, the 
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collinearities between the exchange rate and LLRGL, on the one hand, and between 
the interest rate and LLRGL, on the other, are worth mentioning (with a correlation 
around -0.2 to -0.24). As mentioned above, this was expected. However, multicollin-
earity does not invalidate the regression analysis, as the number of observations is suf-
ficiently large for the estimator to be able to make a difference between the variables. 
Table 1: Model summary
adjusted R2 F-test
Durbin-
Watson
Significance
Number of observations 
(residual degree of freedom)
TIER 0.788 609 2.018 *** 492 (489)
TCR 0.741 726.991 1.972 *** 766 (763)
 ETA 0.798 1156.295 1.987 *** 879 (876)
Note: *** denote significance at 1%. 
Source: The author’s calculations
Table 2: Collinearity indicators
 
TIER TCR ETA
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF
LLRGL 0.891 1.122 0.92 1.087 0.915 1.093
Lagged dependent variable 0.963 1.038 0.685 1.46 0.703 1.422
FX index 0.671 1.49 0.962 1.039 0.944 1.059
Dparent-TBTF 0.979 1.021 0.95 1.052 0.950 1.053
DTax 0.947 1.056 0.698 1.432 0.719 1.39
RATE 0.67 1.492 0.997 1.003 0.984 1.016
Source: The author’s calculations using SPSS, entry mode
The results for the individual regressors are summed up in Table 3. The most im-
portant variable explaining capital adequacy is its value in the preceding period (t-1). 
This is an obvious conclusion, as financial or capital stocks are highly determined by 
their past. It is more interesting that if the dummy is in a TBTF parent’s ownership, it is 
positive and significant in all cases of capital adequacy ratios and both methods. In the 
cases of TCR and ETA, TBTF is significant at the 1% threshold, or in the case of TIER1, 
at 5%. Thus, this regressor remains included in the stepwise method in the functions 
of all capital adequacy variables. This leads to the conclusion that the characteristics of 
bank owners in the CEE region have a positive influence on the capital adequacy ratio.
As for the rest of the variables, LLRGL is insignificant in the cases of TIER1 and 
TCR. It only has a significant influence on ETA, which is expected as the LLRGL provi-
sions directly modify the value of the equity. The FX index is completely irrelevant in 
the determination of the three measures of the dependent variable. The effect of the 
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banking tax is negative, as expected in most specifications, and its impact is comparable 
to the TBTF owner phenomenon. However, it is not so highly significant. The market 
interest rate is only significant in the case of a TCR, calculated with the stepwise method.
Only the t-1 value of the dependent variable and the TBTF parent dummy were in-
cluded in all three capital adequacy regressions at a 5% significance level. The strange 
phenomenon is that the third regressor included is always different in the three func-
tions. This is explained by the considerable differences in the number of observa-
tions, due to data availability. Concerning the value of the constant, ETA has a very 
low value, which indicates that the composed regressors cover the explanation of the 
dependent variable very well.5
Table 3: Results of the regression analysis
TIER TCR ETA
constant
3.908 
(0.609) ***
4.61
(0.479) ***
1.024 
(0.367) ***
lagged dependent variable 
0.883 
(0.017) ***
0.857 
(0.015) ***
0.893 
(0.015) ***
LLRGL excluded excluded
–0.069 
(0.023)***
FX index excluded excluded excluded
Dparent-TBTF
0.052 
(0.604) **
0.064
 (0.451) ***
0.058 
(0.328) ***
DTax
–0.05 
(0.57) **
excluded excluded
RATE excluded
–0.037 
(0.076) **
excluded
N 492 766 879
Note: Standardized coefficients and standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. “Excluded” means that the variable does not meet the 5% significance 
expectation of the stepwise method.
Source: The author’s calculations using SPSS
Conclusions
This study analyses the determinants of capital adequacy in CEE banks. Several po-
tential determinants are identified, such as the TBTF phenomenon of parent banks, 
the FX rate volatility, a changing monetary environment represented by a 3-month 
market rate, fiscal shocks due to sector-specific taxes, and the risk of debtor failure, 
represented by loan loss reserves to the gross loan ratio. Using the insights of the capi-
tal adjustment theory, a regression model is built up to explain capital adjustment.
It is assumed that ownership by a TBTF parent moderated the impact of the crisis 
in CEE commercial banks, as the parent banks recapitalized their affiliates which had 
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turned red with regard to household and corporate lending. This type of cross-market 
rebalancing was confirmed by the regression analysis, which concluded that the par-
ent bank being TBTF or multinational matters in capital adequacy in the CEE region.
By regressing three different capital adequacy indicators of the CEE banks, it is 
possible to draw insights on several determinants. First, multinational banks have been 
instrumental in maintaining capital adequacy and the lending capacity in the CEE re-
gion. In the case of all three capital adequacy indicators, the TBTF parent indicator 
was significant. The TBTF parent banks’ topping up the capital of CEE subsidiaries was 
crucial in the maintenance of financing capacity during the financial crisis, character-
ized by increasing defaults on loans. Second, clear conclusions also emerge on other 
potential determinants. The indicator of NPLs (LLRGL) and the proxy for monetary 
policy (the market rate) had no significant impact on the risk-weighted capital adequa-
cy ratios (TIER1 and TCR). This is in contrast with the sector-specific tax, which had a 
significant adverse impact on these ratios and thus deteriorated the lending capacity.
The empirical results are explained through macroeconomic and regulatory fac-
tors, which have a limited impact on the capacity of CEE affiliates and branches of 
multinational banks, and the single factors that matter in their capitalisation are the 
financial muscle and investment strategy of the parent bank. These factors seem to 
overwrite the default risk of NPLs and previous insights on regional monetary trans-
mission. This is especially obvious in the CEE business environment, where the bank-
ing market is predominated by affiliates in multinational ownership. 
Notes
1  The work was created in commission of the National University of Public Services under the priority 
project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15-2016-00001.
2  For a full summary of the literature, see Bol et al., 2002.
3  Some aspects must be mentioned about the database. Although the global crisis and defaulting domestic 
debtors have made the CEE banking sector unattractive for investors, some changes have nevertheless 
been initiated in the ownership structure of banks to alter their foreign/domestic characteristics. In the 
database, such changes are taken into consideration and are registered dynamically. The CEE banks that 
have shares publicly traded on the stock exchange and thus numerous foreign institutional or private 
investors with low ownership percentages, but no foreign investors with a significant leverage (minimum 
25% ownership), are classified as domestic banks in their countries of residence (such as OTP in Hun-
gary, or PKO Bank or Getin Noble Bank in Poland). The rationale behind this decision is that foreign 
portfolio investments are made through the trade of existing shares on the stock exchange and not via 
initial public offering. The incompleteness of Bankscope made it necessary to chase the owner of some 
CEE banks, as many of these are owned through intermediaries and the geographical source of FDI is not 
always clear, such as in the case of CEE banks with Italian owners. In many cases, the Bankscope database 
was complemented with national banking data (where available). All things considered, the ultimate 
owners’ residence was taken into account. For example, many CEE banks are directly owned by Unicredit 
Bank Austria, which has Austrian residency, but the ultimate owner, Unicredit, is resident in Italy.
4  Although there is a specific indicator for the NPL ratio in the Bankscope, i.e. the NCO/average gross 
loans, the database is very deficient when it comes to CEE banks.
5  As the averages of the three dependent variables are close to one another (TIER = 15.59, TCR = 17.46, 
ETA = 11.77), their constants are comparable.
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